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Abstract
When policy makers want to regulate AI, they must first define what AI is. However, legal definitions
differ significantly from definitions of other disciplines. They are working definitions. Courts must be
able to determine precisely whether or not a concrete system is considered AI by the law. In this paper
we examine how policy makers should define the material scope of AI regulations. We argue that they
should not use the term "artificial intelligence" for regulatory purposes because there is no definition of
AI which meets the requirements for legal definitions. Instead, they should define certain designs, use
cases or capabilities following a risk-based approach. The goal of this paper is to help policy makers who
work on AI regulations.
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1 Introduction
Policy makers around the world consider regulating AI. The EU seems to have taken the lead in this respect
[1]. The European Commission [2, 3, 4], the European Parliament [5, 6, 7] and the High-Level Expert
Group on AI [8, 9] have already published several proposals. In contrast, the USA focus more on removing
regulatory barriers [10]. However, they also acknowledge the need for changing existing regulations [11]. In
China, AI regulation is a national priority [12]. The Chinese AI strategy contains explicit goals regarding
the development of a regulatory framework [13].
Every regulation needs to define its scope of application. It determines whether or not a regulation is
applicable in a particular case. From the regulatee’s perspective, it answers the question: "Do I need to
apply this regulation?" We can distinguish four dimensions in this respect: the material scope ("what"), the
personal scope ("who"), the territorial scope ("where") and the temporal scope ("when"). In this paper we
focus on the material scope. The material scope can refer to an object (e.g. artificial intelligence) and/or
an activity (e.g. the development, deployment and use of AI systems). The terms that are used to define
the material scope are typically defined at the beginning of the regulation. Such a definition is called a legal
definition.
In this paper we examine how policy makers should define the material scope of AI regulations. This
seems to be a non-trivial problem for at least two reasons. First, the term "artificial intelligence" is used for
many different systems ("it isn’t any one thing" [14]). It can refer to systems that navigate self-driving cars
[15], play video games [16, 17, 18] or make medical diagnoses [19, 20, 21]. From a regulatory perspective,
these systems have very different risk profiles and, therefore, must be treated differently. Second, the term
is highly ambiguous. There is a vast spectrum of definitions [22, 23, 24]. Its meaning even changes over
time ("as soon as it works, no one calls it AI any more" [25]). So the question is: How should policy makers
define AI in legal terms? The problem is known. It has been recognized by literature [26, 27, 14, 28] and
policy makers [5, 29, 30, 8]. However, there is not yet a solution. In this paper we structure the problem
and suggest possible solutions.
The question how policy makers should define the material scope of AI regulations can be broken down
into three subquestions: Which elements should they use (Section 2)? How many elements should they use
(Section 3)? Should they define the material scope for the entire regulation and/or for parts of the regulation
(Section 4)?
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2 Elements of the Definition
Which elements should policy makers use to define the material scope of AI regulations?
Methodology. We answer this question in four steps: (1) First, we define requirements for legal definitions.
Some of the requirements are legally binding, others are good legislative practice. (2) Next, we present four
classes of elements which could be used to define the material scope of AI regulations. For each class we
present three examples to illustrate the idea. (3) Third, we discuss whether or not the presented definitions
meet the requirements for legal definitions. (4) Finally, we make concrete recommendations based on the
results of the discussion.
Requirements for Legal Definitions. Legal definitions must meet, among others, the following require-
ments:
(1) Inclusiveness. Legal definitions must not be over- or under-inclusive [31, 32]. The over- or under-
inclusiveness refers to the regulatory goal. A definition is over-inclusive when it includes cases which
are not in need of regulation according to the regulatory goal. It is under-inclusive when cases which
should have been included are not included.
(2) Precision. Legal definitions must be precise. It must be possible to clearly determine whether or not
a particular case falls under the definition. Ideally, all elements of the definition are dichotomous, i.e.
conditions are either met or not. There should not be a range of how much a condition is met.
(3) Comprehensiveness. Legal definitions must be comprehensive. Regulatees must be able to under-
stand whether or not the regulation is applicable in order to adjust their behavior accordingly. The
definition should, therefore, be based on the existing meaning of terms and comply with the natural
use of language. At least in principle, people without expert knowledge should be able to apply the
definition.
(4) Practicability. Legal definitions should be practicable. Regulatees, courts, government authorities
and lawyers must be able to determine with little effort whether or not a concrete case falls under the
definition. The assessment of every element should be possible on the basis of the information typically
available to them.
(5) Permanence. Legal definitions should be permanent. Policy makers should not use elements which
are likely to change in the near future. The need for legislative updating should be avoided.
The first three requirements are legally binding (at least in some jurisdictions). For example, the criterion
inclusiveness can be derived from the principle of proportionality in EU law. Pursuant to Article 5(4) of
the Treaty on European Union1, "the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary
to achieve the objectives of the Treaties". The criteria precision and comprehensiveness are based on the
principle of legal certainty in EU law and the vagueness doctrine in U.S. law. Policy makers in the EU
are required to ensure "that Community rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the
obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their
rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly" [33]. Similarly, the U.S. vagueness doctrine states: "A
criminal statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application lacks the first essential of due process
of law" [34]. The other two criteria practicability and permanence are not legally binding. Instead, they
should be seen as good legislative practice.
In the following, we discuss four classes of elements: artificial intelligence (Section 2.1), design (Section
2.2), use cases (Section 2.3) and capabilities (Section 2.4).
1 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 13–390.
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2.1 Artificial Intelligence
The most obvious approach would be to use the term "artificial intelligence". The material scope could then
be formulated as follows:
This regulation applies to the development, deployment and use of AI systems.
However, there is no generally accepted definition of the term "artificial intelligence". Since its first usage
by John McCarthy in 1955 [35], a vast spectrum of definitions has emerged. In the following, we discuss
three of the most popular definitions. For a more comprehensive collection of definitions we refer to the
relevant literature [22, 23, 24].
Example 1 (Turing Test). The Turing test is arguably the best known AI definition. In 1950, Allan Turing
proposed a test which he called "imitation game" [36]. Based on this test, AI could be defined as follows:
"Artificial intelligence" means any computer that passes the Turing test.
"Turing test" means a game which is played with three participants: (1) a human, (2) a computer
and (3) a human judge. The human judge is separated from the other two participants. They
can only communicate via text. The Turing test is passed if the human judge cannot effectively
discriminate between the human and the computer.
Example 2. Another popular definition goes back to John McCarthy. In 2007, he published the paper
"What is Artificial Intelligence?" [37]. In this paper he defines AI as follows:
"Artificial intelligence" means the science and engineering of making intelligent machines.
"Intelligence" means the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world.
Example 3 (Intelligent Agent). Today, many AI researchers define AI as the study of intelligent agents. For
example, Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig use the following definition in their standard textbook "Artificial
Intelligence: A Modern Approach" [22]:
"Artificial intelligence" means an intelligent agent.
"Agent" means a software system which perceives its environment through sensors and acts upon
that environment through actuators.
"Intelligence" means the ability to select an action that is expected to maximize a performance
measure.
Discussion. Do the above mentioned definitions meet the requirements for legal definitions? Inclusiveness :
From a regulatory perspective, all three definitions are highly over-inclusive. For example, the ability to
achieve goals can be ascribed to many systems which are obviously not in need of regulation (e.g. calculators).
The same holds true for the ability to select an action that is expected to maximize a performance measure
[27]. We would even argue that all AI definitions are inherently over-inclusive. It seems impossible to define
AI in a way that is not over-inclusive. Due to its broadness, the term will always include many different
systems. These systems will have very different risk profiles and, therefore, must be treated differently.
A single definition of AI is unable to cope with the complexity of possible regulatory goals ("there is no
one-size-fits-all"). Apart from that, some AI definitions are also under-inclusive. For example, the Turing
test excludes systems which do not communicate in natural language, even though such systems may need
regulation (e.g. self-driving cars). Similarly, systems which do not achieve their goals or do not maximize
their performance measure would be excluded, even though they can pose significant risks [27]. Precision:
Most AI definitions are highly vague. McCarthy’s definition simply replaces one difficult-to-define term
(intelligence) with another (goal) [27]. The intelligent agent definition is equally vague, especially with
regard to its notion of bounded rationality. In many cases, it is impossible to determine ex-ante whether or
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not a concrete action is expected to maximize a performance measure because ground truth is unattainable.
Even if it was, no system can always select the ideal action. How often does a system need to select the ideal
action in order to be considered intelligent? It could be argued that the Turing test is more precise, given
the empirical nature of the test. However, the test results can still be debatable. For example, it has been
claimed that a chat bot named "Eugene Goostman" has passed the test in 2014 [38, 39]. However, this claim
has not been recognized by the vast majority of AI researchers [40]. Comprehensiveness: It seems debatable
whether or not the above mentioned AI definitions are comprehensive. Practicability: Their practicability is
also debatable. It may be possible to determine whether or not a system is able to achieve goals or maximize
a performance measure on the basis of typically available information. However, the Turing test is highly
impracticable. Courts will not be able to conduct the test every time they have to decide whether or not
a system is considered AI by the law. Permanence: The definitions seem to be sufficiently permanent. For
example, the Turing test is almost 70 years old.
Recommendation. Policy makers should not use the term "artificial intelligence" for regulatory purposes.
There is no definition of AI which meets the requirements for legal definitions. Instead, policy makers should
adopt a risk-based approach: (1) they should decide which specific risk they want to address, (2) identify
which property of the system is responsible for that risk and (3) precisely define that property. In other
words, the starting point should be the underlying risk, not the term AI.
2.2 Design
Policy makers could define how AI systems are designed ("how it’s made"). This class of elements could be
used to address the inherent risks of certain technical approaches.
Example 4 (Reinforcement Learning). For example, the material scope could be limited to systems based
on reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning is used in many real-world AI systems, such as games
[16, 41, 42], robotics [43] and recommender systems [44]. Policy makers may want to address certain safety
risks which are directly linked to reinforcement learning. This includes, among others, reward hacking [45, 46]
and interruptibility [47]. The following definition could be used:
"Reinforcement learning" means the machine learning task of learning a policy from reward
signals that maximizes a value function [48].
Example 5 (Supervised and Unsupervised Learning). Policy makers could also define supervised and un-
supervised learning. These techniques are equally popular. For example, they are used for image recognition
[49], speech recognition [50] and text detection [51]. Policy makers could use these elements to prevent
certain kinds of discrimination. In particular, they could address the inherent risk of supervised and unsu-
pervised learning to reproduce biases which were contained in the training data [52, 53]. The elements could
be defined as follows:
"Supervised learning" means the machine learning task of learning a function that maps from an
input to an output based on labeled input-output pairs [22].
"Unsupervised learning" means the machine learning task of learning patterns in an input even
though no explicit feedback is supplied [22].
Example 6 (Artificial Neural Networks). Another approach would be to define artificial neural networks.
Many machine learning algorithms are based on them. They are responsible for several problematic attributes,
such as interpretability [54] and foreseeability [27, 55]. From a regulatory perspective, these attributes pose
certain risks (e.g. regarding the liability for damages caused by an AI system). Policy makers could use this
element to address these risks. Artificial neural networks could be defined as follows:
"Artificial neural network" means a software architecture which is composed of units connected
by directed links. Each link has a numeric weight associated with it which determines the strength
and sign of the connection. Each unit first computes the weighted sum of its inputs. Then it
applies an activation function to derive the output [22].
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Discussion. Inclusiveness : Most design definitions are over-inclusive. There will always be systems which
use one of the above mentioned designs which should not be subject to regulation (e.g. game-playing agents
based on reinforcement learning). Precision: A system’s design can be defined precisely. It is easy to
determine whether or not a concrete system is designed in a certain way. Comprehensiveness: It seems
debatable whether or not design definitions are comprehensive. On the one hand, they require some degree
of technical know-how. Today, the average judge would probably not be able to apply them. On the other
hand, this might change as AI regulations enter into force and know-how is required. There are already
areas of law which require some degree of technical know-how (e.g. IT law). Practicability: The definitions
are also practicable. The required information are easy to obtain. Permanence: The permanence, however,
is unknown. It is highly uncertain whether today’s technical approaches will be used in the future [56].
Recommendation. Under some conditions, it seems reasonable to use elements of this class. First, policy
makers need to be aware that this requires technology-specific regulation. This might not be intended
[57]. Second, in order to avoid over-inclusiveness, policy makers should combine elements of this class with
elements of other classes. Third, there seems to be a trade-off between precision and permanence. Defining
concrete algorithms (e.g. support vector machines) or libraries (e.g. TensorFlow) would be more precise, but
less permanent. Defining abstract approaches (e.g. symbolic or sub-symbolic) would be more permanent,
but less precise.
2.3 Use Case
Policy makers could also define certain use cases ("what it’s used for"). Many risks do not result from the
system itself, but from its usage.
Example 7 (Self-Driving Cars). For example, policy makers may want to regulate self-driving cars [11,
58, 59]. They could pursue a wide range of regulatory goals in this respect, such as road safety and security.
In the following, we use the definitions developed by SAE International [60]. Since 2014 they publish the
technical standard "SAE J3016" which contains definitions for six levels of automation (Level 0-5). These
definitions have been adopted by policy makers in the USA [11] and the EU [59]. They could be formulated
as follows:
This regulation applies to highly and fully automated driving systems.
"High automation" means the driving mode-specific performance by an automated driving system
of all aspects of the dynamic driving task, even if a human driver does not respond appropriately
to a request to intervene.
"Full automation" means the full-time performance by an automated driving system of all aspects
of the dynamic driving task under all roadway and environmental conditions that can be managed
by a human driver.
"Automated driving system" means the hardware and software that are collectively capable of
performing the entire dynamic driving task on a sustained basis, regardless of whether it is limited
to a specific operational design domain.
"Dynamic driving task" means all of the real-time operational and tactical functions required to
operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding the strategic functions such as trip scheduling and
selection of destinations and waypoints.
Example 8 (Facial Recognition). Another example is facial recognition. Facial recognition is used to tag
photos on social media [61], unlock smartphones [62, 63] as well as state surveillance [64, 65, 66]. However,
the technology can have gender or race biases [67, 68]. It also raises severe privacy concerns [69]. In 2018,
Microsoft had already called for public regulation [70, 71]. In 2019, San Francisco banned the purchase and
use of facial recognition technology by city personnel [72]. Facial recognition can be defined as follows:
"Facial recognition" means the automated identification of a person from a digital image or video.
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Example 9 (Medical Diagnosis). A third example is medical diagnosis. In many domains, AI systems
match or exceed human performance in visual medical diagnosis [19, 20, 21]. These systems are increasingly
deployed in hospitals. However, they can pose significant risks—they can literally be a matter of life and
death [73]. The element could be defined as follows:
"Medical diagnosis" means the process of determining the nature of a disease or disorder and
distinguishing it from other possible conditions [74].
Discussion. Inclusiveness : Definitions of use cases are not inherently over- or under-inclusive. In most
cases, the regulatory goal will be to reduce certain use case-specific risks. Precision: Use cases can be defined
precisely. There is no apparent reason why this might not be possible. Comprehensiveness: They can also
be defined in a comprehensive way. Practicability: We have no concerns regarding the practicability of such
definitions. Permanence: Their permanence, however, is debatable. On the one hand, some use cases are
unlikely to change (e.g. self-driving cars). On the other hand, almost certainly new use cases will occur.
Recommendation. We highly recommend to use this class of elements. However, policy makers should
keep in mind that this will require a sector-specific regulation. It might also require a moderate degree of
legislative updating.
2.4 Capability
Policy makers could also define certain capabilities ("what it can do"). Some risks do not necessarily result
from certain designs or use cases. It can be preferable to address these risks directly.
Example 10 (Physical Interaction). For example, the scope could be limited to AI systems which can
physically interact with their environment. Only these systems can physically harm people, animals, plants
and property. The element could be defined as follows:
"Physical interaction" means the ability to use sensors to perceive the physical environment and
effectors to manipulate this environment [22].
Example 11 (Automated Decision-Making). Another example is the ability to make automated decisions.
Policy makers could use this element to address certain risks resulting from a loss of control [27]. It would
exclude systems which only make suggestions while humans make the final decision. This element is already
being used in Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 15(1)(h) of the GDPR.2 The European Data Protection Board
has endorsed the definition by the Article 29 Working Party:
"Automated decision-making" means the ability to make decisions by technological means without
human involvement [75].
Example 12 (Legally Relevant Effect). A third example is the ability to make decisions which have a legal
or similarly significant effect. From a regulatory perspective, it makes a big difference if a virtual assistant
reminds you on your friend’s birthday or buys products. For example, the latter may require some degree
of consumer protection. This element is also being used in Article 22 of the GDPR. It could be defined as
follows:
"Legal effect" means any impact on a person’s legal status or their legal rights [75].
"Similarly significant effect" means any equivalent impact on a person’s circumstances, behavior
or choices. This may include their financial circumstances, access to health services, employment
opportunities or access to education [75].
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88.
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Discussion. Inclusiveness : Definitions of capabilities will always be over- and under-inclusive. For exam-
ple, industrial robots and vending machines both have the ability to physically interact with their environ-
ment. Their risk profile is very different though. Precision: Capabilities can be defined precisely. In most
cases, they can be formulated in a dichotomous way (e.g. a system either can physically manipulate its
environment or not). Comprehensiveness: Such definitions can also be comprehensive. Practicability: They
are also practicable. Permanence: They also seem permanent.
Recommendation. We recommend to combine elements of this class with elements of other classes. Ca-
pabilities seem particularly well suited to prevent over-inclusiveness.
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Artificial Intelligence · · • • ●
Design · ● • ● ?
Use Case ● ● ● ● •
Capability · ● ● ● ●
Table 1: The table summarizes the results of the discussion. It shows to what extent the presented elements
meet the requirements for legal definitions on a single-element basis. Note that the results may change if
multiple elements are combined. In the table ● means “yes”, • means “debatable”, · means “no” and ? means
"unknown". The table design is inspired by Shane Legg and Marcus Hutter [23].
3 Amount of Elements
How many elements should policy makers use to define the material scope of AI regulations?
Single Element. The first impulse might be to simply select one of the above mentioned elements. A
single-element definition could be formulated as follows:
This regulation applies to Element 1.
Most of the above mentioned elements could be used as Element 1. The only exception are capabilities,
since they need another element which they can refer to ("capability of something"). However, policy makers
should not use single-element definitions, unless the regulation is about a specific use case. In Section 2 we
have argued that most elements are over-inclusive. Consequently, it seems difficult to come up with a
definition which is not over-inclusive by only using a single element. This does not apply for specific use
cases (e.g. self-driving cars).
Multiple Elements. Therefore, policy makers should use multiple elements to define the material scope
of AI regulations. The basic structure of a multi-element definition looks something like this:
This regulation applies to Element 1 which is used for Element 2 and can do Element 3.
Element 1–3 can belong to the same class or different classes. By combining multiple elements, policy
makers can narrow down the scope and thereby prevent over-inclusive definitions.
Example 13 (Multi-Element Definitions). The following examples illustrate the idea:
This regulation applies to reinforcement learning agents which can physically interact with their
environment and make automated decisions.
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This regulation applies to software which is used for medical diagnosis and is based on supervised
or unsupervised learning.
We recommend to use between two and four elements. This seems to be the optimal range to prevent
over-inclusive definitions, while keeping them sufficiently practicable. Definitions based on more than four
elements quickly become impracticable.
4 Scope of the Scope
Should policy makers define the material scope for the entire regulation and/or for parts of the regulation?
Entire Regulation. A definition of the material scope for the entire regulation could be formulated as
follows:
This regulation applies to [...].
Such a definition is typically located at the beginning of the regulation (e.g. Article 2(1) of the GDPR).
It would apply to every provision of the regulation, unless there are exemptions or it is overridden by later
definitions. However, in most cases, such a definition will not be enough. It seems unlikely that there is a
definition of the material scope which is appropriate for all provisions of the entire regulation. There will
always be some provisions which shall only apply to certain cases and thus require more specific definitions.
Parts of the Regulation. Therefore, policy makers should always consider defining the material scope for
parts of the regulation. By "part" we mean any subset of the regulation (e.g. chapters, sections, provisions).
The idea is to define the material scope differently for different subsets:
This chapter/section/provision applies to [...].
This approach allows very specific definitions of the material scope. Policy makers can customize the
material scope for different subset. In principle, every single provision could have its own material scope.
This customization can prevent over- and under-inclusive definitions.
Example 14 (Nested Approach). Policy makers could nest different definitions into each other. For
example, they could define the material scope at three different levels: (1) for the entire regulation, (2) for
individual chapters and (3) for individual provisions:
This regulation applies to software which is used for medical diagnosis.
This chapter applies to systems which use supervised or unsupervised learning.
Systems which can perform surgeries are required to [...].
We cannot make any concrete recommendations regarding the scope of the scope. The concrete distribu-
tion of different scopes depends on many variables (e.g. the subject of concrete provisions).
5 Conclusion
Recommendations. In this paper we have examined how policy makers should define the material scope
of AI regulations. In particular, we have made the following recommendations:
• Section 2: Policy makers should not use the term "artificial intelligence" for regulatory purposes because
there is no definition of AI which meets the requirements for legal definitions. Instead, they should
define certain designs, use cases and/or capabilities following a risk-based approach.
• Section 3: Policy makers should not use a single element to define the material scope, unless the
regulation is about a specific use case. In most cases, they should use multiple elements.
• Section 4: In most cases, policy makers should define the material scope differently for different parts
of the regulation.
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Implications. The findings of this paper have further implications for other regulatory questions:
• First, they affect the regulatory approach. In particular, it seems impossible to define the material
scope of a cross-sector, technology-neutral regulation. In this case, the definition could not refer to
the design and use cases since they would be sector- and technology-specific. The only remaining
elements would be AI and capabilities. However, definitions based on these two elements will always
be over-inclusive.
• Second, there will be a need for legislative updating. Policy makers should always define certain
designs and/or use cases. Both elements are likely to change over time. Consequently, policy makers
will have to update the definition of the material scope. A possible solution could be to use a very
broad definition on the legislative level which is supplemented by a more specific definition on the
non-legislative level (e.g. in administrative provisions). Definitions on the non-legislative level can be
updated more easily because they do not need to undergo the legislative process.
• Third, the recommendations apply to definitions by courts and government authorities. In particular,
courts and government authorities should resist the temptation to formulate their own AI definition.
Again, all definitions of AI will be highly over-inclusive and vague and, therefore, entirely useless for
legal purposes.
Open Questions. The following questions remain open:
• How should the material scope of a concrete regulation be formulated? The answer to this question
depends on a wide range of variables, such as the regulatory goal, the regulatory approach and the
subject of concrete provisions. Therefore, we cannot make any concrete recommendations in this
respect.
• In Section 2 we have suggested four classes of elements. Are there other classes? Within each class we
have only presented a few examples. Should they be defined differently? Which other elements are in
each class?
• Is there a need for exemptions? Typically, there are some cases which fall under the definition of the
material scope which should not be included. For example, the GDPR does not apply to the processing
of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity (Article
2(2)(c) of the GDPR). Which exemptions should be defined in the context of AI regulation?
• In this paper we have focussed on the object of the material scope. How should the corresponding
activity be defined? For example, it would be conceivable to define the activities for different phases
of the lifecycle of an AI system: development, deployment and use [8].
• In this paper we have focused on the material scope. How should the other dimensions of the scope of
application be defined, i.e. the personal, regional and temporal scope?
• There are many other regulatory questions: Should AI be regulated at all? Which regulatory approach
should policy makers take? Which regulatory goals should they pursue? Which policy instruments
should they use? How should AI regulations be enforced?
Defining the material scope of AI regulations requires careful consideration. The author hopes that this
paper comes at the right time to help policy makers with this challenge.
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